CO129-530-9 Deportation Amendment Ordinance- 1931 2-4-1931 - 14-12-1931 — Page 48

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3. In any case, I would still respectfully

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maintain my objection to the provisions in question,

partly because of the limited character of the duty which

they impose on the judge, as explained in my letter of

the 20th May, 1931, and partly because they make the

judiciary part of the machinery of executive action.

the enquiry were one in which all the witnesses adverse

If

to the accused gave evidence on oath before the judge, and

could be cross-examined, those objections would lose a

good deal of their weight.

4. I still fear that difficulty may arise on

the question of the nature of the evidence. To take a

very practical point, ought the judge to be prepared to

act on the written statement of an unidentified informer

or not?

5. I might perhaps remind Your Excellency that

the courts may at any time be called upon to decide on

the validity of the proceedings in some particular

deportation case, and for this reason alone it seems to

me desirable to avoid, if possible, making the judges

part of the machinery of deportation. It is true that

only one case of this kind has occurred hitherto, i.e.

the case of Li Hong Mi, which went to the Privy Council

and resulted in favour of the deportee (Li Hong Mi v.

Attorney General for Hong Kong, (1920) A.C. 735), but

other cases may occur.

That objection, however, is

only a minor one.

His Excellency,

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

Sir William Peel, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,

(sd.) J. H. Kemp.

Chief Justice.

Governor.